Structure-preserving desynchronization of minority games by Mosetti, Giancarlo et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
90
1.
20
78
v2
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  2
2 A
ug
 20
09
Structure-preserving desynchronization of minority games
Giancarlo Mosetti and Damien Challet
De´partement de physique, Universite´ de Fribourg, Pe´rolles, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland and
ISI Foundation, Vialle Settimio Severo 65, 14011 Turin, Italy
Sorin Solomon
The Racah Institute of Physics, Hebrew University,, Jerusalem, 91905, Israel and
ISI Foundation, Vialle Settimio Severo 65, 14011 Turin, Italy
(Dated: October 30, 2018)
Perfect synchronicity in N-player games is a useful theoretical dream, but communication delays
are inevitable and may result in asynchronous interactions. Some systems such as financial markets
are asynchronous by design, and yet most theoretical models assume perfectly synchronized actions.
We propose a general method to transform standard models of adaptive agents into asynchronous
systems while preserving their global structure under some conditions. Using the Minority Game as
an example, we find that the phase and fluctuations structure of the standard game subsists even
in maximally asynchronous deterministic case, but that it disappears if too much stochasticity is
added to the temporal structure of interaction. Allowing for heterogeneous communication speeds
and activity patterns gives rise to a new information ecology that we study in details.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 89.75.Fb, 64.60.De
I. INTRODUCTION
When a large number of agents taking part in a multi-
player game submit their actions to a central authority
(game server, financial market), the times at which their
actions become effective are likely to differ because of
reaction times, transmission delays or backlogs at the
central server. If the resulting delay is sufficiently large,
the synchronicity of actions and payoffs is not a reason-
able assumption anymore. Yet the immense majority of
the literature on games and agents assumes perfect syn-
chronicity (see however e.g. [1, 2, 3] for some notable
exceptions).
This is problematic in the modelling of many systems,
among which the numerous financial markets where the
actions of agents are discrete in time and asynchronous.
Most financial market models aggregate traders’ actions
over a given period in one time step. Unless it corre-
sponds to sensible time periods, such as one trading day,
this approach is rather artificial. While time coarsening
simplifies the description of market dynamics, specula-
tion cannot be modelled by including all the agents’ ac-
tions in one time step: one does not make money with
a single transaction, i.e. in a single time step. In ad-
dition, the emergence of large price and volume fluctua-
tions must also be explained in an asynchronous setting.
Finally asynchronicity also originates from the hetero-
geneity of time scales of market participants, which is
fat-tailed, possibly a power-law [4, 5, 6].
This raises fundamental issues regarding macroscopic
synchronization, especially in the case of coordination
and cooperation. Here we modify the well-understood
minority game [7] by introducing a tunable time delay
between the submission of a bid and its actual influence
on the global outcome, and a tunable playing frequency.
Remarkably the structure of mean-field models such
FIG. 1: Schematic explanation of playing period T , time delay
δ, bids b(t) and actions a(t+ δ).
as the MG is preserved; as a consequence there is hope
that the resulting asynchronous interaction somehow still
belongs to the mean-field category, hence, that the pow-
erful methods from statistical mechanics that solve the
original model [8, 9] can be generalized.
II. DESYNCHRONIZING GLOBAL GAMES
Let us consider a global synchronous game. Each agent
i = 1, · · · , N takes action ai(t) at time t. His payoff is a
function of his own action and of the global action of all
the agents A(t) =
∑N
j=1 aj(t): everything can be written
as a function of time t only.
A way to desynchronize the agents while preserving
the global structure of the game is to think in terms of
delays: if agent i submits his action at time t, the latter
becomes effective (i.e. is incorporated into A) only at
time t+ δ. But at time t+ δ, A(t+ δ) only contains the
actions effective at that time, that is, does not contain
the action of some other agents that are still being trans-
mitted or thought about. Thus, the payoffs of the agents
at this time do not reflect the most recent actions, but
only the last known actions. Differentiating between ac-
tions sent but not effective yet, thereafter called bids and
2denoted by bi(t), and actual actions ai(t) makes it easy
to introduce asynchronous actions while keeping intact
the payoff structure, as will be shown in the next section
(see Fig. 1).
Mathematically, agent i submits his bid bi(t); between
times t and t+ δ− 1, his last known action is unchanged;
at time t+δ, the last bid becomes effective, i.e. ai(t+δ) =
bi(t) and of course A(t + δ) =
∑
i ai(t+ δ); agent i then
receives his payoff that depends on ai(t+δ) and A(t+δ).
In this way, a non-trivial structure of overlapping bids
and actions can be built.
The temporal structure of the game is completely spec-
ified by assuming that agent i is active at times t
(n)
i ,
n > 0. For instance, t
(n)
i nTi + φi where n is an inte-
ger. The maximally asynchronous case corresponds to
Ti = N and φi = i: only one agent is active at each time
step. Alternatively, an agent may be active with some
probability at each time step, thereby removing the rigid
structure imposed by periodic t
(n)
i .
III. EXAMPLE: MINORITY GAMES
The minority game (MG thereafter) is a prototype
model of global competition between adaptive agents
[7, 8]. Well-understood [8, 9], it provides an ideal test-
bed for new ideas and extensions. At the same time,
it has highly non-trivial and characteristic fluctuations
structure and phase transition. The existence of a phase
transition with symmetry breaking [10, 11] is robust with
respect to a surprising number and types of modifications
[8, 12]; as such, if present in modified games, it is a sig-
nature that the original dynamics has not been overly
altered.
The aim of the agents is, as the name of the game
implies, to be in the minority: in the original game, agent
i takes action ai(t) ∈ {−1, 1}; A(t) is defined as above
and is positive if the majority chose +1 and vice-versa.
The payoff of agent i is −ai(t)A(t): those who happen to
be in the minority are rewarded.
The various types of minority games found in the lit-
erature differ mostly in their learning and decision mech-
anisms. The original one is defined as follows: agents
are fed with the last m winning decisions, a bitstring
called history and denoted by µ(t). Each agent has a
set of S strategies, i.e., of predefined ways to react to
all possible public pieces of information. Denoting the
strategies of agent i by ai,s, s = 1, · · · , S, one can rewrite
A(t) =
∑
i a
µ(t)
i,si(t)
where si(t) is the strategy trusted by
agent i at time t.
Which strategy to choose is determined by reinforce-
ment learning. To this effect, since the agents gather
information about the world through the use of their
strategies, they store experience about the past in vir-
tual performance scores of their strategies that evolve
according to
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t)− aµ(t)i,s A(t) (1)
The agents choose their best strategy at time t. In other
words, si(t) = argmaxs Ui,s(t).
When desynchronizing the game, a slight complication
with respect to game histories arises: whereas in perfectly
synchronized games µ(t) is the same for all the agents,
this cannot hold anymore in asynchronous settings since
all the agents do not see the same A when they receive a
payoff. Thus each agent has his own history of the game,
which encodes the past m right choices for him.
By construction 〈A〉 = 0. We shall be interested in the
fluctuations of the global outcome σ2 = 〈A2〉 which quan-
tify the degree of coordination of the players, the bench-
mark being the random outcome σ2 = N . Predictability
must be measured at the individual level: one defines the
conditional average of the attendance from the point of
view of agent i, that is, conditional to his histories, which
we denote as 〈A(i)|µi〉, and the predictability as seen by
this agent Hi =
∑
µi
〈A(i)|µi〉2/P , where P = 2M , while
the average predictability is H =
∑
iHi/N .
Predictability H > 0 corresponds to a (conditional)
symmetry breaking between the two choices. The stan-
dard game is characterized by a predictable phase (H >
0) for α = P/N > αc, an unpredictable phase (H = 0,
α < αc) and critical point αc = 0.3374 . . . where H → 0
and σ2/N reaches a minimum [8, 9, 10, 11]. The pres-
ence of this phase transition is acknowledged to be robust
with respect to many modifications of the game, except
when all the agents take into account their impact on
the game by removing their contribution to A, i.e., by
replacing A with A−i = A − ai(t) in Eq (1) [12, 13].
However, little is known about the importance of the
synchronization of histories with respect to the existence
of the phase transition. Local games are synchronized
MGs where an agent plays against his neighbors, giving
rise to partially spatially overlapping games, hence, his-
tories [14, 15], whereas the overlaps are in time in our
case.
Another issue is the information ecology: given the fact
that predictability is easily measured, MGs give insights
on who exploits whom [16], that is, in this case, on the
risk associated with delays, for instance. Since the MG
is a negative sum game, making an average positive gain
is hard; it is only achieved in the original game by some
agents that can exploit very efficiently the predictabil-
ity left by other agents, such as e.g. some of those able
to settle on one strategy in the standard game (frozen
agents) [10, 11, 16], speculators feeding on producers,
insider trading or a longer history length deep in the un-
predictable phase [16]. Recently two of us designed and
studied synchronous MGs where the agents had hetero-
geneous time scales [17]. Here we shall characterize the
importance of communication delays and frequency of
play.
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FIG. 2: Fluctuations σ2/N (red squares; right scale) and
predictability H/N (black circles; left scale) of the maxi-
mally asynchronous MG as a function of α = P/N . M = 4
(P = 16), S = 2, 400NP iterations, 200NP time steps until
equilibration, averages over 200 samples.
A. Results
Numerical simulations are about N times slower than
those of the usual MGs, as one effective time-step from
a measurement point of view ends when all the agents
have updated their actions. Even worse, the interesting
regions are found for quite low α = P/N , which makes
computations even slower. This unfortunately limits the
system sizes one can study with current computers to
M = 4, i.e. P = 16. Indeed one run for the maximally
asynchronous case at P = 32 and P/N = 0.01 needs 150
minutes a modern computer (Core 2 duo, 2GHz) , hence
averaging over 200 samples requires 20 days just for this
point. Fortunately, M = 4 yields good enough results,
as discussed in the concluding section.
1. Maximally asynchronous game
Assuming that t
(n)
i = nTi + φi as above and setting
Ti = T = N and φi = i, there is only one active agent at
each time step, hence A changes at most by 2 in a time
step. In this case, the histories µi of agents 1 and N/2
will likely differ, unless the dynamics of A has a memory
longer that N/2.
Plotting as usual σ2/N and H/N reveals that this sys-
tem undergoes the same phase transition as the original
minority game (see Fig. 2). This means that the desyn-
chronization we propose has the remarkable property to
keep the global structure of the game unchanged, while
allowing for extreme asynchronicity. It is notable that the
predictability is orders of magnitude smaller than σ2/N ,
which is to be expected since the very long time delays Ti
of the agents dilutes information; the order of magnitude
of the fluctuations on the other hand is unchanged, since
A ∝
√
N .
The auto-correlation of A reveals a complex pattern,
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FIG. 3: Autocorrelation of A(t) in a population with hetero-
geneous time delays Ti; M = 4 (P = 16), N = 51, S = 2,
400NP iterations, 200NP time steps until equilibration.
similar to that seen in Fig. 3: since A is only possibly
changed by only one agent at a time, it displays persis-
tence for O(N/2) time steps. After this decay, it shows
on average negative auto-correlation, as can be expected
in a minority game where every deviation from A = 0
tends to be cancelled by adaptive agents. The additional
oscillations are of period N .
2. Heterogeneous time delays
The pattern of auto-correlation of A suggest that play-
ing with a high frequency allows one to take profit from
the persistence of A.
Drawing at random Ti from {1, · · · , ρN} and setting
δi = Ti, allows one to study the respective gains associ-
ated with a time scale denoted by 〈g|T 〉 = 〈g|δ〉, in order
words, the information ecology that arises from being
active more often and having a shorted delay in an asyn-
chronous setting. Figure 4 shows that in asynchronous
situations being faster is an clear advantage, a few of the
agents reaping even positive gains.
Positive gains come quite peculiarly for minority games
from the unconditional persistence of A. Computing the
autocorrelation.〈A(t)A(t+ τ)〉 (Fig. 3) shows a memory
of A lasting N/2 time steps, which corresponds exactly to
the point where the losses of the agents saturates in Fig
4. Earning a positive gain, though, requires enough per-
sistence to overcome the cost of play the MG, a negative
sum game.
3. Activity frequency and time delays
In the two previous subsections, one assumed that the
frequency of activity of a given agent is exactly equal to
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FIG. 4: Average gain of agents with a given time delay Ti
versus Ti M = 4 (P = 16), N = 101, S = 2, 400NP itera-
tions, 200NP time steps until equilibration, averages over 105
samples.
FIG. 5: Contour plot M = 4 (P = 16), N = 101, S =
2, 400NP iterations, 200NP time steps until equilibration,
averages over 105 samples.
his time delay. This restriction is unrealistic and can be
lifted easily: assume that an agent plays every Ti time
steps and has a time delay of δi. The delay δi may happen
to be larger than Ti: if an agent is unfortunate enough to
have a larger delay than activity frequency, he waits for
δi time steps to receive his payoff and sends a new bid at
the next possible activity time t
(n)
i .
The average gains conditional on δ and T , denoted
by 〈g|δ, T 〉, reveal in more details the information ecol-
ogy of asynchronicity: Figure 5 reports a contour plot of
〈g|δ, T 〉; T and δ play a similar role: the more frequently
one is active, the more one can profit from the persistence
of A, i.e., from the slowness of other players, as before.
But δ, which can be seen as the quickness of reaction to
new information, is expectedly the most relevant param-
0.01 0.1 1
α=P/N
0.01
0.1
1
H
/N
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 σ
2 /N
FIG. 6: Predictability H/N and fluctuations σ2/N as a func-
tion of α = P/N for Poissonian activity (θ = 1). M = 4
(P = 16), S = 2, 400NP iterations, 200NP time steps until
equilibration, averages over 200 samples.
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FIG. 7: Fraction of frozen agents φ and fluctuations σ2/N as
a function of θ/N for Poissonian activity for a single realisa-
tion of the disorder. M = 4 (P = 16), S = 2, 80000NP/θ
iterations, 4000NP/θ time steps until equilibration.
eter: it mainly controls whether one obtains a positive or
negative gain, except around δ = 4, where T plays this
role; the gain decreases as T increases, which is consis-
tent with the results of the previous subsection. The last
feature of the plot is the slight bump at δ = T , which is
due to the fact that the players who have δ = T +1 have
effectively T ′ = 2T , hence the slight decrease of average
gain.
54. Poissonian activity
Finally, let us relax completely the periodicity of agent
activity: each agent i plays now at time t with probability
θ/N ; the standard MG is recovered when θ = N . We first
take θ = 1, which is stochastically equivalent to the setup
of section III A 1, except that the temporal interaction
has no more structure. Figure 6 suggests that the phase
transition disappears completely, at least for the range of
parameters we swept over (we tried also tried individual
runs at α = 0.001 that confirm this result).
This means that at least some structure of overlap be-
tween the histories of the agents is a crucial ingredient of
the phase transition. If the phase transition is resilient
to some stochastic perturbation of the personal history
update temporal structure, one should find a critical θc
for which a system placed in the symmetric phase under-
goes a phase transition when sweeping over θ. The best
way to test for a phase transition is to plot the fraction of
frozen agents, φ, defined as the fraction of agents which
played the same strategy during the last half of the time
steps [11]. The only situation for which φ = 0 can occur
is when H = 0. Figure 7 shows that the system stays in
the symmetric phase as long as θ ≥ θc/N ≃ 0.5 and then
φ increases rapidly. The fluctuations drop discontinu-
ously at θ = 1: anergordicity is broken by stochasticity,
but the system stays in a symmetric phase.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have proposed a powerful and generic way to desyn-
chronize global games while preserving their structure.
The resulting asynchronicity allows for the study of the
effect of time delays and playing frequency in principle
in any N -player game.
Desynchronized MGs provide yet another example
of the robustness of the phase transition in MGs (see
the many other phase transition-preserving modifications
listed in [8]). We did not study in detail the location of
this phase transition; additional lengthy numerical sim-
ulations are needed to study this point in detail, in par-
ticular as a function of T .
The fact that the phase transition disappears in the
presence of strong enough stochastic desynchronization
is a clue that this robustness relies on the temporal struc-
ture of individual history updates, as also confirmed by
the fact that history-less games (P = 1) [18, 19] do not
reproduce the delay information ecology found in the
present study. Interestingly, recent work on the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma showed that similar Poissonian desyn-
chronization leads to a first order phase transition at fi-
nite activity frequency [20].
Although we had to consider quite small systems (M =
4), the results presented here will not change qualitative
when simulating much larger systems is doable. Finite
size effects of minority games are well-studied [8]; two
points are crucial: i) all the macroscopic variables de-
pend only on α = 2M/N , up to finite size effects; ii) the
existence of the phase transition is found for allM > 1. It
should be noted that macroscopic variables (H/N , σ2/N)
of the MG with real histories may have peculiar finite size
effects for very small M because of the De Bruijn graph
on which bitstrings of length M live; when M ≥ 4, its
complexity is large enough to prevent the histories of the
game to be stuck in a small trivial subgraph.
The familiar phase structure of asynchronous games
suggests to solve this kind of games with mathematical
methods that have been successfuly applied to the orig-
inal MGs and some of its extensions [8, 9]. Two new
problems arise: first actions are delayed, which makes
the whole calculus more complex; the second problem
comes from the fact that each agent has his own real his-
tory: solving the standard MG with real (global) histo-
ries was a mathematical tour de force [9, 21]; solving sys-
tems with individual histories will need an even more im-
pressive feat. Nevertheless, there is nothing in principle
that makes the computation infeasible, although it will
be much more complex. We hope that such future work
will reveal the inner dynamical effects of asynchronicity.
[1] B A Huberman and N S Glance. Evolutionary games
and computer simulations. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci.,
90(16):7716–7718, 1993.
[2] Roger Lagunoff and Akihiko Matsui. Asynchronous
choice in repeated coordination games. Econometrica,
65(6):1467–1478, 1997.
[3] V. Bhaskar and F. Vega-Redondo. Asynchronous Choice
and Markov Equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory,
103(2):334–350, 2002.
[4] Paul Lynch and Gilles Zumbach. Market heterogeneities
and the causal structure of the volatility. Quantitative
Finance, 3:320–331, 2003.
[5] F. Lillo. Limit order placement as an utility maximiza-
tion problem and the origin of power law distribution of
limit order prices. Eur. Phys. J. B, 55(4):453–459, 2007.
physics/0612016.
[6] D. Challet and D. Morton. Trader heterogeneity and
market efficiency. 2009. in preparation.
[7] D. Challet and Y.-C. Zhang. Emergence of cooperation
and organization in an evolutionary game. Physica A,
246:407, 1997. adap-org/9708006.
[8] Damien Challet, Matteo Marsili, and Yi-Cheng Zhang.
Minority Games. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.
[9] A. A. C. Coolen. The Mathematical Theory of Minority
Games. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.
[10] R. Savit, R. Manuca, and R. Riolo. Adaptive competi-
tion, market efficiency, and phase transitions. Phys. Rev.
Lett., 82:2203–2206, 1999.
[11] D. Challet and M. Marsili. Symmetry breaking and phase
transition in the minority game. Phys Rev. E, 60:R6271,
61999. cond-mat/9904392.
[12] Andrea de Martino and Tobias Galla. The transition to
efficiency in minority games. J. Phys. A: Math. Gen.,
41(32):324003, 2008.
[13] D. Challet, M. Marsili, and R. Zecchina. Statistical me-
chanics of heterogeneous agents: minority games. Phys.
Rev. Lett., 84:1824–1827, 2000. cond-mat/9904392.
[14] T. Kalinowski, H.-J. Schulz, and M. Briese. Cooperation
in the minority game with local information. Physica A,
277(3–4):502–508, 2000.
[15] S. Moelbert and P. De Los Rios. The local minority
game. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applica-
tions, 303(1-2):217–225, 2002.
[16] D. Challet, M. Marsili, and Y.-C. Zhang. Modeling mar-
ket mechanisms with minority game. Physica A, 276:284,
2000. cond-mat/9909265.
[17] G. Mosetti, D. Challet, and Y.-C. Zhang. Minority games
with heterogeneous timescales. J. Stat Mech: Exp and
Theory, 2005. physics/0509078, submitted.
[18] M. Marsili and D. Challet. Trading behavior and excess
volatility in toy markets. Adv. Complex Systems, 3(I):3–
17, 2001. cond-mat/0011042.
[19] Damien Challet, Andrea De Martino, and Matteo Mar-
sili. Dynamical instabilities in a simple minority game
with discounting. J. Stat Mech: Exp and Theory, 2008.
[20] A. Saif and P. M. Gade. Prisoner’s dilemma and semi-
synchronous updates: evidence for a first order phase
transition. J. Stat Mech: Exp and Theory, page P07023,
2009.
[21] A. C. C. Coolen. Generating functional analysis of minor-
ity games with real market histories. J. Phys. A: Math.
Gen., 38(11):2311–2347, 2005.
